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Ulrich Berger
Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, Institute VW 5,
Augasse 2-6, A-1090 Wien, Austria
Abstract
Fictitious Play is the oldest and most studied learning process for games. Since
the already classical result for zero-sum games, convergence of beliefs to the set of
Nash equilibria has been established for several classes of games, including weighted
potential games, supermodular games with diminishing returns, and 3×3 supermod-
ular games. Extending these results, we establish convergence of Continuous-time
Fictitious Play for ordinal potential games and quasi-supermodular games with
diminishing returns. As a by-product we obtain convergence for 3×m and 4×4
quasi-supermodular games. JEL classification: C72, D83.
Key words: Fictitious Play; Learning Process; Ordinal Potential Games;
Quasi-Supermodular Games.
1 Introduction
The Fictitious Play Process was originally introduced by Brown (1949, 1951)
as an algorithm to calculate the value of a two-person zero-sum game. Today,
Fictitious Play serves as the prime example of myopic belief learning (see Fu-
denberg and Levine, 1998) and has its place in almost every modern textbook
on game theory. Recently it has also proven useful as a simple optimization
heuristic (Garcia et al., 2000, Lambert et al., 2005).
In this paper we focus on the continuous-time version of Fictitious Play. The
belief paths of this process have been shown to converge to the set of Nash
equilibria in several classes of games, among them two classes which are defined
via cardinal conditions: supermodular games with diminishing returns and
weighted potential games. We show here, that the defining cardinal conditions
can be weakened considerably. Convergence indeed continues to hold under the
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respective ordinal conditions, i.e., in quasi-supermodular games and in ordinal
potential games.
Brown (1949) introduced both the continuous-time and the discrete-time ver-
sion of Fictitious Play. Due to its obvious shortcomings for computational
purposes, the continuous-time version was neglected for many years until its
revival by Rosenmu¨ller (1971). However, for analytical studies the continuous-
time version is often easier to handle than the discrete-time one, and mainly
for this reason recent work on Fictitious Play has paid more attention to the
continuous-time process. 1
In a Discrete-time Fictitious Play (DFP) process two players are engaged
in the repeated play of a bimatrix game. After an arbitrary initial move, in
every round each player takes the empirical distribution of her opponent’s
strategies as her belief and responds with a pure strategy that maximizes
her expected payoff, i.e., with a myopic best response. We say that a DFP
process approaches equilibrium, if the sequence of beliefs converges to the
set of Nash equilibria of the game. A game is said to have the Discrete-time
Fictitious Play property (DFPP), if every DFP process approaches equilibrium
in this game. Analogously, the continuous-time version of Fictitious Play is
called Continuous-time Fictitious Play (CFP), and a game is said to have
the Continuous-time Fictitious Play Property (CFPP), if every CFP process
approaches equilibrium.
It is well known that there are games without the DFPP or the CFPP. 2
Shapley (1964) demonstrated this with an example of a 3×3 game where
the beliefs of DFP converge to a limit cycle. The same phenomenon also
occurs with CFP. Other classes of games where either DFP or CFP (or both)
have been shown to fail convergence include Cowan (1992), Jordan (1993),
Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1995), Foster and Young (1998), and Krishna
and Sjo¨stro¨m (1998).
However, most of the research concerned with Fictitious Play tried to identify
classes of games where every Fictitious Play process approaches equilibrium.
The largest classes of games where this is known (both for CFP and DFP)
are zero-sum games (Robinson, 1951), 2×n games (Berger, 2005), dominance
solvable games (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991), supermodular games with di-
minishing returns (Krishna, 1992) 3 , and weighted potential games (Monderer
1 It should also be noted that this process is closely related to the Best Response
Dynamics of Gilboa and Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992), which some authors
prefer to work with.
2 Without assuming a particular tie-breaking rule, there are Fictitious Play pro-
cesses that do not even approach equilibrium in 2×2 games, as shown by Monderer
and Sela (1996). In such a case one needs a nondegeneracy condition, see Monderer
and Shapley (1996). We therefore assume nondegenerate games throughout this
paper.
3 Krishna’s 1992 working paper on DFP, though often cited, remained unpublished.
Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m (1997) present a proof for CFP, but refer back to Krishna
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and Shapley, 1996). The modern proofs for the CFP versions are usually much
easier than the older proofs for the DFP process, 4 (e.g. Rosenmu¨ller, 1971,
Hofbauer, 1995, or Harris, 1998). For overviews on these results see Krishna
and Sjo¨stro¨m (1997) or Hofbauer and Sigmund (2003).
It is an open question if Fictitious Play also approaches equilibrium in su-
permodular games without diminishing returns. A small step in this direction
was done by Hahn (1999), who showed that 3×3 supermodular games have
the CFPP.
Milgrom and Shannon (1994) showed that many of the known results for su-
permodular games can already be derived under the weaker condition of quasi-
supermodularity. Krishna (1992) raised the question, if quasi-supermodularity
could already suffice for his result. However, as he explains, his proof does not
extend to this larger class of games.
Monderer and Shapley (1996) defined the class of ordinal potential games,
which contains the class of weighted potential games. For the latter, they
prove convergence of beliefs to the equilibrium set. The conjecture that this
result carries over from weighted to ordinal potential games has been explicitly
doubted by Monderer and Sela (1997).
The present paper extends the described results of Krishna (1992), Hahn
(1999), and Monderer and Shapley (1996) for the CFP process. We show that
all nondegenerate quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns have
the CFPP. Concerning potential games, we prove that also nondegenerate
games with an ordinal potential have the CFPP. 5 As a by-product, we finally
obtain convergence of CFP in nondegenerate 3×m and 4×4 quasi-supermodular
games.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce
the notation and terminology we use, and define supermodular and quasi-
supermodular games, diminishing returns, nondegeneracy, weighted and ordi-
nal potential games, Fictitious Play, and games with the pure Nash equilibrium
property. Section 3 contains two important properties of CFP. In Section 4 we
derive the first main result on ordinal potential games. Section 5 is concerned
with quasi-supermodular games with diminishing returns, and contains the
second main result. In Section 6 we turn to 3×m and 4×4 quasi-supermodular
games, and Section 7 concludes. The proofs of the last two results can be
found in the Appendices A and B.
(1992) for a part of this proof.
4 A three-line sketch of Robinson’s (1951) celebrated result already appeared in
Brown (1949) for the CFP process.
5 Note that the set of ordinal potential games is much larger than the set of weighted
potential games. The set of n×m bimatrix games can be identified with the Euclidean
space R2nm. Within this space, the set of ordinal potential games contains an open
set, while the set of weighted potential games has Lebesgue–measure zero (if n ≥ 2
and m ≥ 3).
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2 Notation and Definitions
2.1 Bimatrix Games and Best Responses
Let (A,B) be a bimatrix game where player 1, the row player, has pure strate-
gies i ∈ N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and player 2, the column player, has pure strategies
j ∈ M = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. A and B are the n×m payoff matrices for players 1
and 2. Thus, if player 1 chooses i ∈ N and player 2 chooses j ∈M , the payoffs
to players 1 and 2 are aij and bij, respectively. The set of mixed strategies of
player 1 is the n− 1 dimensional probability simplex Sn, and analogously Sm
is the set of mixed strategies of player 2. With a little abuse of notation we will
not distinguish between a pure strategy i of player 1 and the corresponding
mixed strategy representation as the i-th unit vector ei ∈ Sn. Analogously we
identify player 2’s pure strategy j with the j-th unit vector fj ∈ Sm. Some-
times we will also speak of the players choosing a row, or column, respectively,
of the bimatrix.
The expected payoff for player 1 playing strategy i against player 2’s mixed
strategy y = (y1, . . . , ym)
t ∈ Sm (where the superscript t denotes the transpose
of a vector or matrix) is (Ay)i. Analogously (B
tx)j is the expected payoff for
player 2 playing strategy j against the mixed strategy x = (x1, . . . , xn)
t ∈ Sn.
If both players use mixed strategies x and y, respectively, the expected payoffs
are x · Ay to player 1 and y · Btx to player 2, where the dot denotes the
scalar product of two vectors. We denote by BR2(x) player 2’s pure strategy
best response correspondence, and by br2(x) her mixed strategy best response
correspondence. Analogously, BR1(y) and br1(y) are the sets of player 1’s
pure and mixed best responses, respectively, to y ∈ Sm. Let BR(x,y) =
BR1(y)×BR2(x) and br(x,y) = br1(y)×br2(x). We say that (xˆ, yˆ) is a best
response to (x,y) ∈ Sn×Sm, if (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ br(x,y). Also, we call (xˆ, yˆ) a pure
best response to (x,y), if (xˆ, yˆ) ∈ BR(x,y). A strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is a
Nash equilibrium if and only if (x∗,y∗) ∈ br(x∗,y∗). It is called a pure Nash
equilibrium, if (x∗,y∗) ∈ BR(x∗,y∗).
2.2 Quasi-Supermodular Games and Supermodular Games
Definition 1 (i) A bimatrix game (A,B) is quasi-supermodular, if for all
i < i′ and j < j′:
ai′j > aij =⇒ ai′j′ > aij′ and bij′ > bij =⇒ bi′j′ > bi′j.
(ii) A bimatrix game (A,B) is supermodular, if for all i < i′ and j < j′:
ai′j′ − aij′ > ai′j − aij and bi′j′ − bi′j > bij′ − bij.
We write QSMG short for quasi-supermodular game, and SMG for supermod-
ular game. In a QSMG, the payoff difference between two payoffs in a column
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of A or a line of B can change its sign at most once, and only from −1 to +1,
if the players move up to a higher column or line, respectively. In a broader
context, these games have been studied by Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
From Definition 1, quasi-supermodularity is implied by supermodularity. In
an SMG, the advantage of switching to a higher strategy increases when the
opponent chooses a higher strategy.
Both QSMGs and SMGs have frequently been called games with strategic com-
plementarities. We refrain from using this term to avoid confusion. Originally,
the term “strategic complementarities” was coined by Bulow et al. (1985)
to denote games with increasing best response correspondences. This prop-
erty is already implied by quasi-supermodularity. SMGs have been introduced
(in a much more general framework) by Topkis (1979) and studied by Vives
(1990) and Milgrom and Roberts (1990). This class of games has important
applications in economics, e.g. in models of oligopolistic competition, R&D
competition, macroeconomic coordination, bank runs, network externalities,
and many others.
2.3 Games with Diminishing Returns
Another condition we use is diminishing returns, sometimes also referred to
as diminishing marginal returns. As the name suggests, this property means
that the payoff advantage of increasing one’s strategy is decreasing.
Definition 2 A bimatrix game (A,B) has diminishing returns (DR), if for
all i = 2, . . . , n− 1 and j ∈M ,
ai+1,j − aij < aij − ai−1,j,
and for all i ∈ N and j = 2, . . . ,m− 1,
bi,j+1 − bij < bij − bi,j−1.
Krishna (1992) observed that DR restrict the best response correspondence in
the following way.
Lemma 3 Let (A,B) be a game with DR. Then for any (x,y) ∈ Sn×Sm, the
sets BR1(y) and BR2(x) contain at most two strategies. If one of these sets
contains two strategies, they are numbered consecutively.
2.4 Nondegenerate Games
As mentioned above, without assuming a tie-breaking rule, one must impose
a nondegeneracy assumption in order to keep the CFPP, even in the class of
2×2 games. We work with games which are nondegenerate in the following
specific sense.
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Definition 4 We call a bimatrix game (A,B) degenerate, if for some i, i′ ∈
N , with i 6= i′, there exists j ∈ M with ai′j = aij, or if for some j, j′ ∈ M ,
with j 6= j′, there exists i ∈ N with bij′ = bij. Otherwise, the game is said to
be nondegenerate.
We write ND((Q)SM)G short for nondegenerate ((quasi-)supermodular) game.
2.5 Potential Games
Monderer and Shapley (1996) define several classes of games with a so-called
potential. The class of ordinal potential games contains the class of weighted
potential games.
Definition 5 (i) A bimatrix game (A,B) is an ordinal potential game, if
there exists an ordinal potential function, i.e. a function F : N×M → R,
such that for all i, i′ ∈ N and j, j′ ∈M ,
ai′j−aij > 0⇔ F (i′, j)−F (i, j) > 0 and bij′−bij > 0⇔ F (i, j′)−F (i, j) > 0.
(ii) A bimatrix game (A,B) is a weighted potential game, if there exist positive
weights w1 and w2 and a function F : N×M → R, such that for all i, i′ ∈ N
and j, j′ ∈M ,
ai′j − aij = w1[F (i′, j)− F (i, j)] and bij′ − bij = w2[F (i, j′)− F (i, j)].
They also define improvement paths and games with the finite improvement
property. We extend this definition slightly by defining improvement steps.
Definition 6 For a bimatrix game (A,B), define the following binary relation
on N×M : (i, j)→ (i′, j′) ⇔ (i = i′ and bij′ > bij) or (j = j′ and ai′j > aij).
If (i, j) → (i′, j′), we say that this is an improvement step. We denote by
|i′ − i| + |j′ − j| the length of the improvement step. An improvement path
is a (finite or infinite) sequence of improvement steps (i1, j1) → (i2, j2) →
· · · in N ×M . An improvement path (i1, j1) → · · · → (ik, jk) is called an
improvement cycle, if (ik, jk) = (i1, j1). A bimatrix game is said to have the
finite improvement property (FIP), if every improvement path is finite, i.e.,
if there are no improvement cycles.
It is clear that every nondegenerate ordinal potential game (NDOPG) has the
FIP. Monderer and Shapley (1996) show that also the opposite direction holds.




Definition 8 For the n×m bimatrix game (A,B), the sequence (it, jt)t∈N is
a Discrete-time Fictitious Play process, if (i1, j1) ∈ N×M and for all t ∈ N,
(it+1, jt+1) ∈ BR(x(t),y(t)),













Note that the beliefs can be updated recursively. The belief of a player in
round t+1 is a convex combination of his belief in round t and his opponent’s








Continuous-time Fictitious Play can roughly be described as the limiting “zero
step size” version of DFP. Replacing the 1’s in (1) by  and letting → 0 we
obtain CFP.
Definition 9 A strategy path in N×M is a function [0,∞] → N×M, t 7→
(it, jt), whose points of discontinuity have no finite accumulation point in R.
For the n×m bimatrix game (A,B), a strategy path (it, jt)t≥0 is a Continuous-
time Fictitious Play path, if for almost all t ≥ 1,
(it, jt) ∈ BR(x(t),y(t)),







If a (discrete- or continuous-time) Fictitious Play process converges, it must
be constant from some stage on, implying convergence to the respective pure
Nash equilibrium. Even if a process does not converge, it is easily established
that if the beliefs converge, then the limit must be a Nash equilibrium. As
noted above, however, there are games where the beliefs need not converge.
If at some point in time the best response set is multivalued, there may be sev-
eral possible continuations of a Fictitious Play process. To handle this multi-
plicity of solutions, particular tie-breaking rules have sometimes been imposed.
6 Brown’s (1951) original definition has players updating alternatingly instead of
simultaneously, but this version has disappeared from the literature, see Berger
(2006).
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Krishna (1992) or Hahn (1999) e.g. assumed that both players, whenever in-
different between two or more pure strategies, choose the strategy with the
highest number. However, we do not impose any tie-breaking rule.
CFP is closely related to the Best Response Dynamics,
(x,y)(1) ∈ Sn×Sm, (x˙, y˙)(t) ∈ br((x,y)(t))− (x,y)(t) (2)
for almost all t ≥ 1, a social learning process for large populations which was
introduced by Gilboa and Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992). 7
It should be noted here, that—apart from tie-breaking rules—basically two dif-
ferent definitions of CFP can be found in the literature. 8 Definition 9 above
is the one most commonly used. It implies that CFP belief paths are piecewise
linear, pointing at pure-strategy pairs in the state space. As a consequence,
CFP paths need not exist for all beliefs in all games. To see this, think of
a Matching Pennies game where at time t = 1 the beliefs are at the mixed
equilibrium. No CFP continuation of this path is possible. However, for all
other beliefs at time t = 1, a CFP path exists. On the other hand, if the be-
liefs at t = 1 are at the completely mixed equilibrium of a pure coordination
game, then there are as many CFP continuations as there are pure coordina-
tion equilibria, each belief path leading straight from the completely mixed
equilibrium to one of these pure ones.
Harris (1998) takes a different approach and defines a Continuous-time Ficti-
tious Play process as a solution—up to a rescaling of time—to the differential
inclusion (2). Any CFP belief path according to Definition 9 is such a solution,
but in general there are more solutions to (2) than there are CFP belief paths.
For example, in both the Matching Pennies game and the pure coordination
game depicted above, there are solutions to (2) which stay constant at the
completely mixed equilibrium. The Best Response Dynamics has the advan-
tage that solutions can be shown to exist through all initial values. However,
in this paper we follow the majority and stick to the usual definition of CFP.
The analysis of Hofbauer (1995) shows that CFP paths exist in every game
with the pure Nash equilibrium property. To explain this property, let N ′ ⊂ N
and M ′ ⊂ M be nonempty subsets of the players’ pure strategy sets. We call
the restriction of the original game to these pure strategy subsets a bimatrix-
subgame. 9 The following definition is from Takahashi and Yamamori (2002).
Definition 10 A game has the pure Nash equilibrium property (PNEP), if
every bimatrix-subgame has a pure Nash equilibrium.
7 For an interesting connection between the Best Response Dynamics and Discrete-
time Fictitious Play see Benaim et al. (2005).
8 Brown’s (1949) definition is informal, but corresponds to the definition we use
here.
9 Takahashi and Yamamori (2002) simply call it a subgame. To avoid confusion
with the notion of a subgame in the context of extensive form games, we refrain
from using this term.
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Existence of CFP paths in games with the PNEP follows, because for ev-
ery (x,y)(t) ∈ Sn×Sm, the CFP path can be continued with a pure Nash
equilibrium of the bimatrix-subgame with N ′×M ′ = BR(x(t),y(t)).
Ordinal potential games, quasi-supermodular games, and dominance-solvable
games have pure Nash equilibria. Since for games in these classes, any bimatrix-
subgame is again a game of the same class, these games have the PNEP. The
belief paths follow straight lines in the simplex product as long as the CFP
path is constant. Whenever one of the players switches to another pure best
response, the belief path changes its direction discontinuously. This can only
happen when the belief path crosses a so-called indifference hyperplane, the
set of mixed strategy profiles where one of the players is indifferent between
two best responses. A formal definition of switching follows.
Definition 11 We say that a CFP path (it, jt) switches from (i, j) to (i
′, j′)
at time t1 > 1, if (i
′, j′) 6= (i, j) and there exists  > 0 with (it, jt) = (i, j) for
t ∈ [t1 − , t1[ and (it, jt) = (i′, j′) for t ∈]t1, t1 + ].
3 Two Improvement Principles for CFP
Whenever switching occurs along a CFP path, at least one of the players
changes her strategy. The next lemma, called the Improvement Principle, is
due to Monderer and Sela (1997), see also Sela (2000). It shows that the ‘new’
strategy of the switching player must be a weakly better response than her
‘old’ strategy against the ‘old’ strategy of the opponent. To keep the analysis
self-contained, we repeat the proof here.
Lemma 12 If a CFP path for the bimatrix game (A,B) switches from (i, j)
to (i′, j′), then
ai′j ≥ aij and bij′ ≥ bij.
Proof. Let t1 be the time where the process switches from (i, j) to (i
′, j′).
Then both players are indifferent between their respective best responses,
{(i, j), (i′, j′)} ⊂ BR(x(t1),y(t1)). By Definition 11 there exists  > 0 with
(it, jt) = (i, j) for t ∈ [t0, t1[, where t0 = t1 − . Hence (x(t1),y(t1)) is a
convex combination of (x(t0),y(t0)) and (i, j), and we can write (ei, fj) =
c(x(t1),y(t1))+(1−c)(x(t0),y(t0)) for some c ≥ 1. Left-multiplying the second
component vector with the payoff matrix A yields Afj = cAy(t1) + (1 −
c)Ay(t0). Subtracting the i-th line of this vector equation from the i
′-th line
gives
ai′j − aij = c[(Ay(t1))i′ − (Ay(t1))i] + (1− c)[(Ay(t0))i′ − (Ay(t0))i].
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation is zero, and the second
term is nonnegative, since i ∈ BR1(y(t0)) and c ≥ 1. Hence ai′j ≥ aij. By the
same reasoning we get bij′ ≥ bij. 2
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The following complement of Lemma 12 is an essential requirement of our
proofs. We call it the Second Improvement Priciple.
Lemma 13 If a CFP process for the bimatrix game (A,B) switches from (i, j)
to (i′, j′), then
ai′j′ ≥ aij′ and bi′j′ ≥ bi′j.
Proof. Again let t1 be the time where the process switches from (i, j) to (i
′, j′),
then {(i, j), (i′, j′)} ⊂ BR(x(t1),y(t1)). By Definition 11 there exists  > 0
with (it, jt) = (i
′, j′) for t ∈]t1, t2], where t2 = t1 + . Hence (x(t2),y(t2)) is a
convex combination of (x(t1),y(t1)) and (i
′, j′), and we can write (ei′ , fj′) =
c(x(t2),y(t2))+(1−c)(x(t1),y(t1)) for some c ≥ 1. Left-multiplying the second
component vector with the payoff matrix A yields Afj′ = cAy(t2) + (1 −
c)Ay(t1). Subtracting the i-th line of this vector equation from the i
′-th line
gives
ai′j′ − aij′ = c[(Ay(t2))i′ − (Ay(t2))i] + (1− c)[(Ay(t1))i′ − (Ay(t1))i].
The second term on the right-hand side of this equation is zero, and the first
term is nonnegative, since i′ ∈ BR1(y(t2)). Hence ai′j′ ≥ aij′ . By the same
reasoning we get bi′j′ ≥ bi′j. 2
If only one of the players switches her strategy at time t1, i.e. if i = i
′ or
j = j′, then in both of these two Lemmas, one of the inequalities is triv-
ially true, while the other inequalities are then identical. Only if both players
switch simultaneously, Lemma 13 comes into use. If, moreover, the game is
nondegenerate, then the strict inequalities hold. In this case we know that
(i, j)→ (i′, j)→ (i′, j′), and also (i, j)→ (i, j′)→ (i′, j′).
4 CFP in Ordinal Potential Games
By the last remark, if a CFP path switches from (i, j) to (i′, j′) in a non-
degenerate game, then these two pure strategy pairs are connected by an
improvement path, even if both players switch simultaneously.
Lemma 14 If a CFP path for the NDG (A,B) switches from (i, j) to (i′, j′),
then there is an improvement path from (i, j) to (i′, j′).
This is essentially all we need for the first main result.
Theorem 15 Let (A,B) be an NDOPG. Then it has the CFPP.
Proof. Assume there is an NDOPG without the CFPP. In a nonconvergent
CFP path there are infinitely many switches. Since there are only finitely
many pure-strategy pairs, however, the CFP path switches to one such pair
infinitely often. Hence there must be a cyclic sequence of switches. By Lemma
14, this means that there is an improvement cycle. By Lemma 7 then, the
game cannot have an ordinal potential, which contradicts the assumption. 2
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Fig. 1. The construction in the proof of Lemma 18. No sequence of
length-1-improvement steps can return to the starting point (i∗, j∗).
5 CFP in Quasi-Supermodular Games with Diminishing Returns
If a CFP path switches from (i, j) to (i′, j′), then at the switching point
(x(t1),y(t1)), player 1 is indifferent between i and i
′, and player 2 is indif-
ferent between j and j′. From Lemma 3, an immediate consequence of this is,
that in games with DR, CFP can only switch to neighboring strategies.
Lemma 16 Let (A,B) be a game with DR. If a CFP path switches from (i, j)
to (i′, j′), then |i′ − i| ≤ 1 and |j′ − j| ≤ 1.
As a consequence, in an NDG with DR, any CFP path generates an improve-
ment path where every improvement step has length 1. Lemma 14 then implies
the following.
Lemma 17 Let (A,B) be an NDG with DR. If a CFP path does not converge,
then there exists an improvement cycle consisting of improvement steps of
length 1.
However, the next result states that in NDGs, quasi-supermodularity prevents
the existence of such improvement cycles.
Lemma 18 In an NDQSMG, every improvement path consisting of length-1-
steps is finite.
Proof. Let (A,B) be an NDQSMG. Assume the game admits an improvement
cycle consisting of length-1-steps. Take any pair (i∗, j∗) in this cycle, where the
next step is to (i∗, j∗ + 1)—it is easy to see that such a pair always exists. By
quasi-supermodularity, we have (i′, j∗)→ (i′, j∗ + 1) for all i′ ≥ i∗, see Figure
1. Since the cycle eventually returns to column j∗, there must be a line i− with
(i−, j∗+1)→ (i−, j∗). We know that i− < i∗ then. Since the improvement cycle
leads from (i∗, j∗ + 1) to (i−, j∗ + 1), it contains a step (i∗, j+)→ (i∗ − 1, j+)
with j+ > j∗. Then quasi-supermodularity implies (i∗, j′)→ (i∗− 1, j′) for all
j′ < j+, including all j′ ≤ j∗. But this implies that no improvement step of
length 1 can enter the region of pairs (i, j) with i ≥ i∗ and j ≤ j∗ (coloured
grey in Figure 1). Hence no sequence of such improvement steps can lead back
from (i∗, j∗ + 1) to (i∗, j∗), contradicting the initial assumption. 2
As a corollary of Lemmas 17 and 18, we obtain our second main result.
11
Theorem 19 Every NDQSMG with DR has the CFPP.
6 CFP in 3×m and 4×4 Quasi-Supermodular Games
It has been conjectured (e.g. Krishna and Sjo¨stro¨m, 1997) that in (nondegen-
erate) SMGs, the condition of DR is not really necessary for CFP to converge.
Hahn (1999) has shown that this is true at least for 3×3 games, if one uses
the same tie-breaking rule as Krishna (1992). While we cannot prove the con-
jecture, we can extend Hahn’s result to 3×m and 4×4 NDQSMGs. Basically,
these games have the CFPP because they have the FIP, and hence an ordinal
potential.
Theorem 20 Every 3×m NDQSMG has the CFPP.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Theorem 21 Every 4×4 NDQSMG has the CFPP.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Unfortunately, this method of proof does not extend to NDQSMGs with ‘more’
strategies. An example of a 4×5 NDQSMG with the improvement cycle (1, 4)→
(1, 3)→ (2, 3)→ (2, 1)→ (2, 5)→ (3, 5)→ (3, 2)→ (4, 2)→ (4, 4)→ (1, 4) is
(A,B) =

3, 4 3, 3 2, 2 2, 1 0, 0
2, 2 2, 4 3, 1 3, 0 1, 3
1, 2 0, 4 0, 1 0, 0 2, 3




In this paper, we have combined the Improvement Principle of Monderer and
Sela (1997) with what we called the Second Improvement Principle to show
that a CFP path essentially follows an improvement path. It is then an easy
consequence that in NDOPGs, since these games have the FIP, every CFP
path converges. The observation that improvement steps along a CFP path in
games with DR have length 1 allowed us to prove the CFPP for NDQSMGs
with DR. Finally, 3×m and 4×4 NDQSMGs could be shown to have the FIP,
and hence the CFPP. These four main theorems extend the respective results
of Monderer and Shapley (1996), Krishna (1992), and Hahn (1999).
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Fig. A.1. The construction in the proof of Theorem 20.
A Proof of Theorem 20
Let (A,B) be a 3×m NDQSMG, and assume w.l.o.g. that there are no
dominated strategies. Then (1, 1) and (3,m) are equilibria, and (3, 1) →
(2, 1) → (1, 1) and (1,m) → (2,m) → (3,m). Also, (1, k) → (1, k − 1) for
all k = 2, . . . ,m, and (3, k)→ (3, k+1) for all k = 1, . . . ,m−1. Assume there
is an improvement cycle.
Suppose there is an improvement step from (3, j′′) to (1, j′′) in the improve-
ment cycle. Then by quasi-supermodularity, (3, j) → (1, j) for j = 1, . . . , j′′.
In the next step, the cycle must move ‘left’ or ‘down’ in Figure A.1. Since the
cycle cannot reach the equilibrium (1, 1), there must eventually be a step down
from, say, (1, j′). This step cannot be to line 3, since (3, j′)→ (1, j′). Hence it is
(1, j′) → (2, j′), as in Case a) of Figure A.1. Then by quasi-supermodularity,
(1, j′′) → (2, j′′). This implies (3, j′′) → (2, j′′). Hence (3, j) → (2, j) for
j = 1, . . . , j′′. But this means that if we continue the improvement path back-
wards from (3, j′′), we move to the left and can never leave line 3, ending up in
(3, 1). This is a contradiction, since (3, 1) cannot be part of an improvement
cycle. If, on the other hand, there is a step (2, j′′)→ (1, j′′) in the cycle, then
we also have (2, j′)→ (1, j′), and the improvement step leaving line 1 must be
(1, j′)→ (3, j′), see Case b) of Figure A.1. This implies (2, j′)→ (3, j′). Hence
(1, j)→ (3, j) and (2, j)→ (3, j) for j = j′, . . . ,m. But then the improvement
path moves to the right from (3, j′) and can never leave line 3, ending up in
the equilibrium (3,m). This is again a contradiction, since (3,m) cannot be
part of an improvement cycle. This means the game has the FIP, and hence
an ordinal potential. By Theorem 15 then, it has the CFPP. 2
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B Proof of Theorem 21
Let (A,B) be a 4×4 NDQSMG, and assume w.l.o.g. that there are no dom-
inated strategies. Then (1, 1) and (4, 4) are equilibria, and (4, 1) → (3, 1) →
(2, 1) → (1, 1) and (1, 4) → (2, 4) → (3, 4) → (4, 4). Similarly, (1, 4) →
(1, 3) → (1, 2) → (1, 1) and (4, 4) → (4, 3) → (4, 2) → (4, 1). Assume now
that there is an improvement cycle C. By Theorem 20, a 3×4 NDQSMG has
no improvement cycles, hence C must involve all four lines and all four columns
of the bimatrix (A,B). An improvement cycle cannot involve the equilibria
(1, 1) and (4, 4). Moreover, it cannot involve the pairs (1, 4) and (4, 1), since no
improvement step leads to one of these pairs. Hence C contains (1, 2) or (1, 3).
Assume it contains (1, 3), and the next step leads to the pair (k, 3). Then
C involves an improvement path of the form (i, 3) → (1, 3) → (k, 3), where
i, k ≥ 2. But then replacing this part of C by (i, 3)→ (k, 3) creates a shorter
improvement cycle, which does not involve the first line of the bimatrix—which
is a contradiction. Hence, if C contains (1, 3), then it contains the improvement
step (1, 3) → (1, 2). An analogous argument shows that if C contains (1, 2),
then it contains (1, 3)→ (1, 2). This means that in any case (1, 3)→ (1, 2) is
a part of C. Applying the same reasoning to the last line of the bimatrix, we
can conclude that C also contains (4, 2)→ (4, 3).
Next we introduce some notation for the possible orderings of payoffs in the
second and third column of A:
Let v = (a22 − a12, a32 − a22, a42 − a32, a32 − a12, a42 − a22, a42 − a12) and
w = (a23 − a13, a33 − a23, a43 − a33, a33 − a13, a43 − a23, a43 − a13).
From the last paragraph we know that C involves improvement paths of the
form (i, 3)→ (1, 3)→ (1, 2)→ (k, 2) and (i′, 2)→ (4, 2)→ (4, 3)→ (k′, 3) for
some i, k ≥ 2 and i′, k′ ≤ 3. This yields the rules R1 and R2 below. From the
transitivity of the relation “greater than” we can deduce rules R3–R6. The
last rule, R7, follows from quasi-supermodularity.
R1: v1 > 0 or v4 > 0 or v6 > 0. w1 < 0 or w4 < 0 or w6 < 0.
R2: v3 > 0 or v5 > 0 or v6 > 0. w3 < 0 or w5 < 0 or w6 < 0.
R3: v1 > 0, v2 > 0 =⇒ v4 > 0, and v1 < 0, v2 < 0 =⇒ v4 < 0.
w1 > 0, w2 > 0 =⇒ w4 > 0, and w1 < 0, w2 < 0 =⇒ w4 < 0.
R4: v2 > 0, v3 > 0 =⇒ v5 > 0, and v2 < 0, v3 < 0 =⇒ v5 < 0.
w2 > 0, w3 > 0 =⇒ w5 > 0, and w2 < 0, w3 < 0 =⇒ w5 < 0.
R5: v3 > 0, v4 > 0 =⇒ v6 > 0, and v3 < 0, v4 < 0 =⇒ v6 < 0.
w3 > 0, w4 > 0 =⇒ w6 > 0, and w3 < 0, w4 < 0 =⇒ w6 < 0.
R6: v1 > 0, v5 > 0 =⇒ v6 > 0, and v1 < 0, v5 < 0 =⇒ v6 < 0.
w1 > 0, w5 > 0 =⇒ w6 > 0, and w1 < 0, w5 < 0 =⇒ w6 < 0.
R7: vk > 0 =⇒ wk > 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ 6.
Now we examine all possible distinct cases.
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• Case A: v6 < 0.
· Case A1: v1 < 0. R1 =⇒ v4 > 0. R5 =⇒ v3 < 0. R2 =⇒ v5 > 0. R4
=⇒ v2 > 0. R7 =⇒ w2, w4, w5 > 0.
Case A11: w1 > 0. R6 =⇒ w6 > 0, contradicting R1.
Case A12: w1 < 0.
Case A121: w3 > 0. R5 =⇒ w6 > 0, contradicting R2.
Case A122: w3 < 0.
· Case A2: v1 > 0. R6 =⇒ v5 < 0. R2 =⇒ v3 > 0. R5 =⇒ v4 < 0. R3
=⇒ v2 < 0. R7 =⇒ w1, w3 > 0.
Case A21: w4 > 0. R5 =⇒ w6 > 0, contradicting R1.
Case A22: w4 < 0.
Case A121: w5 > 0. R6 =⇒ w6 > 0, contradicting R2.
Case A122: w5 < 0.
• Case B: v6 > 0. R7 =⇒ w6 > 0.
· Case B1: w1 > 0. R1 =⇒ w4 < 0. R5 =⇒ w3 > 0. R2 =⇒ w5 < 0. R4
=⇒ w2 < 0. R7 =⇒ v2, v4, v5 < 0. R5 =⇒ v3 > 0. R6 =⇒ v1 > 0.
· Case B2: w1 < 0. R6 =⇒ w5 > 0. R2 =⇒ w3 < 0. R5 =⇒ w4 > 0. R3
=⇒ w2 > 0. R7 =⇒ v1, v3 < 0. R5 =⇒ v4 > 0. R6 =⇒ v5 > 0. R4
=⇒ v2 > 0.
Let us ignore v6 and w6 for the moment and write vA = sgn(v1, . . . , v5), and
wA = sgn(w1, . . . , w5), where sgn(x) = +(−) if x >(<) 0. Then the analysis of
the different cases above shows that there are only two possible combinations
(vA,wA): vA = wA = (−+−++) and vA = wA = (+−+−−). Repeating
this argument for player 2 instead of player 1, we get exactly the same possible
payoff orderings in the second and third line of B. With the analogous notation
for player 2, the two possibilities are vB = wB = (−+−++) and vB = wB =
(+ − + − −). Hence, all in all there are four possible combinations of these
payoff orderings in a 4×4 NDQSMG without dominated strategies. These
orderings are indicated by arrows in Figure B.1. Note that in case (a), (2, 2)
and (3, 3) cannot be contained in C, since there is no improvement step to
(2, 2), and (3, 3) is a strict equilibrium. The same is true for the pairs (2, 3)
and (3, 2) in case (b), for (3, 2) and (2, 3) in case (c), and for (3, 3) and (2, 2)
in case (d).
Consider now cases (a) and (c). We know that C contains the improvement
step (4, 2) → (4, 3). The improvement step following this one can only be
(4, 3)→ (1, 3), and by quasi-supermodularity (R7) this implies (4, 2)→ (1, 2).
But the improvement step preceding (4, 2)→ (4, 3) can only be (1, 2)→ (4, 2),
which yields a contradiction. Next consider cases (b) and (d). C contains the
improvement step (1, 3) → (1, 2). The improvement step following this one
can only be (1, 2) → (4, 2), and R7 then implies (1, 3) → (4, 3). But the
improvement step preceding (1, 3) → (1, 2) must be (4, 3) → (1, 3), which
yields a contradiction. Hence an improvement cycle does not exist, and the
game is an NDOPG. By Theorem 15, it has the CFPP. 2
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Fig. B.1. The construction in the proof of Theorem 21.
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